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INTRODUCTION
Humans set up vast machinery to control uncertainty. In pursuit
of firm answers, we assemble smart deliberators and take their “ver1
dict” as correct; we consult experts; we poll our peers. But recent experiments suggest that one metric—the price signal—can produce
2
startlingly accurate predictions of uncertain events.
In an information market, people trade shares in uncertain out3
comes. A now-infamous experiment demonstrates how information
†
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1
See Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 963 (2005) (explaining that statistical methods, deliberation accompanied by a reasoned exchange of ideas and opinions, and information markets all elicit information held by the members of groups).
2
Id. at 1023-34 (discussing the advantages of the price signal and providing examples of its success).
3
Information markets have inspired a great deal of academic work in the recent
past. See generally INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS (Robert
W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2006) [hereinafter INFORMATION MARKETS] (addressing a number of theoretical and practical questions on information markets); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE (2006) (exploring
different methods for accessing many minds, with a special focus on information markets); Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004) (suggesting that information
markets could help objectively assess government policy); Michael Abramowicz, Predictive Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 82 (2006) (“Because information markets need
not have any legal consequences, they complete the separation of a prediction mechanism from the decision about what the government should do with the prediction.”);
Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets To Improve Public Decision
Making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213 (2005) (presenting information markets as a
new framework for containing uncertainty and arguing that information from the
prices in these markets is likely to be much more accurate than other forecasts); Saul
Levmore, Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic
Markets and the Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589 (2003) (exploring how the
lessons from simple markets, such as information markets, can aid in understanding
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markets can work in a practical setting. In 2001, the U.S. Department
of Defense and other federal agencies launched a pilot project called
the Policy Analysis Market in order to predict trends in global politics
4
that could affect U.S. interests. Prices of shares in the market would
indicate whether participants thought certain events were probable or
improbable. For example, one “future” was the military preparedness
5
of other nations. Put simply, a high price would predict a high level
of preparedness. The government scuttled the market after a political
backlash in 2003, but the example illustrates how information markets
6
can serve as an “important supplement to deliberative processes.”
There are good reasons to believe that groups can come up with
7
better answers than individual experts. But when groups, such as
teams of government officials, assemble to solve problems, they com8
monly fall into “groupthink.” Members may, for example, erroneously defer en masse to an apparently knowledgeable individual, or
they may decline to air unorthodox views for fear of extrinsic social
9
consequences. These flaws can produce unwise decisions.
An information market, like a deliberative group, “aggregate[s]
10
information . . . about future events.” But what distinguishes the in11
formation market is the availability of the price signal. When a future uncertain event is identified, players bid on chances based on
and regulating more complex markets); Sunstein, supra note 1 (discussing the remarkable successes of information markets and arguing that they are worth sustained attention); Matthew Einbinder, Note, Information Markets: Using Market Predictions to Make
Administrative Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 149 (2006) (proposing that decision makers in
an administrative context should use information markets to inform their decisions
because of the empirical evidence of their predictive accuracy); Robin Hanson, Shall
We Vote on Values, but Bet on Beliefs? (Sept. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://hanson.gmu.edu/futarchy.pdf (proposing that we can change our government institutions to rely more on speculative markets because such markets induce
people to acquire and share knowledge).
4
See Robin D. Hanson, Designing Real Terrorism Futures, 128 PUB. CHOICE 257, 25961 (2006) (detailing the purpose and design of the Policy Analysis Market).
5
Id. at 259.
6
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1028-29.
7
See id. at 971-72 (providing examples of studies that show that the average answer
of groups of sufficiently large sizes is usually very accurate). For a popular account, see
generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiii (2004) (exploring how
“under the right circumstances, groups are remarkably intelligent and are often
smarter than the smartest people in them”).
8
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 965.
9
Id. at 984-86.
10
Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?, 14 ELECTRONIC MARKETS 243, 243 (2004).
11
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1023.
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whether they think the event is likely or unlikely to occur. The price
at any point in time represents the players’ “collective consensus” on
12
the likelihood of the outcome.
Cass Sunstein argues that information markets can correct for the
problems inherent in deliberative groups by
impos[ing] the right incentives for people to disclose the information
that they hold. . . . [I]n a deliberating group, members often have little
incentive to say what they know. By speaking out, they provide benefits
to others, while possibly facing high private costs. Information markets
realign incentives in a way that is precisely designed to overcome these
problems. Because investments in such markets are generally not disclosed to the public, investors need not fear reputational sanctions if, for
example, they have predicted that a company’s sales will be low or that a
13
certain candidate will be elected president.

Because people must put their own money at risk in an information
14
market, they tend to use the knowledge they have. “Insiders” act on
closely held knowledge, which makes prices reflect reality to the
15
greatest possible extent.
Despite the conspicuous fate of the Policy Analysis Market, successful counterexamples abound. The Iowa Electronic Market (IEM)
16
is perhaps the most famous information market. It allows traders to
17
wager a limited amount of real money on a variety of future events.
In a consistent and well-publicized stream of successes, IEM traders
predicted the results of four U.S. elections within a very small margin
18
of error.
12

See Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 10, at 243 (“[T]he trading price reflects
the traders’ collective consensus about the expected [outcome].”); Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 1030 (“[T]he market price reflects the aggregate information held by participants.”).
13
Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1024.
14
Id.
15
See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 4, at 265 (noting that in terrorism futures markets,
terrorists or people close to terrorists might be enticed to reveal valuable information).
16
IEM is hosted by professors at the University of Iowa’s Henry B. Tippie College
of Business. See Joyce E. Berg & Thomas A. Rietz, The Iowa Electronic Markets: Stylized
Facts and Open Issues, in INFORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3, at 142, 143-45 (describing the IEM).
17
See id. at 143. IEM’s most celebrated predictions have concerned election results, but other predictions include “political appointments, outcomes of legislative
processes, international relationships, economic indicators, movie box office receipts,
market capitalizations after an initial public offering (IPO), corporate earnings forecasts, corporate stock price returns, and the incidence of influenza.” Id.
18
See Levmore, supra note 3, at 591 (“The market-share security on the IEM has
averaged an error rate of 1.37% over the last four elections, and this . . . error is well
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Another popular market is the Hollywood Stock Exchange (HSX),
which is similar in most respects to the IEM except that its traders use
19
“play money.” Participants trade “virtual” shares in actors and mov20
ies and attempt to predict box office revenues. The information the
market produces is accurate enough that “HSX has started to sell data
collected through the Exchange to the major studios which can profit
21
from accurate predictions of film revenues.”
Perhaps the most ambitious view is that markets can improve government decision making by aggregating views on what policies are
likely or unlikely to work. Economist Robin Hanson proposes, for example, that we “vote on values, but bet on beliefs”—that is, we should
rely on democracy to identify “what we want,” but “let speculative
22
markets say how to get what we want.”
In a 2002 article, Tom Bell explored the feasibility and legality of
markets for “science claims”—theories that eventually would prove to
23
be true or false. Bell identified the concern that such markets might
run afoul of state and federal gambling laws, concluding that the legal
24
analysis is “uncomfortably uncertain” due to a “dearth of controlling

below that of the major polling organizations.”). Betting on presidential elections is
not a new phenomenon. See Paul W. Rhode & Koleman S. Strumpf, Historical Prediction Markets: Wagering on Presidential Elections 2 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/BettingPaper_10Nov2003_
long2.pdf (“At times in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, betting on political outcomes at the Curb Exchange in New York would exceed trading in stocks and
bonds.”).
19
Levmore, supra note 3, at 592.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 593. There are many other anecdotes on the accuracy of information
markets:
Orange juice futures improved on National Weather Service forecasts, horse
race markets beat horse race experts, Oscar markets beat columnist forecasts,
gas-demand markets beat gas-demand experts, stock markets beat the official
NASA panel at fingering the guilty company in the Challenger accident, election markets beat national opinion polls, and corporate sales markets beat official corporate forecasts.
Robin Hanson, Foul Play in Information Markets, in INFORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3,
at 126, 126 (citations omitted).
22
Hanson, supra note 3, at 2. Hanson offers a rule for policy formation: “when
speculative markets clearly estimate that a proposed policy would increase expected
national welfare, that policy becomes law.” Id.
23
Tom W. Bell, Gambling for the Good, Trading for the Future: The Legality of Markets
in Science Claims, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 159, 159 & n.1 (2002).
24
Id. at 167.
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25

cases or clearly applicable statutes.” More recent analyses have also
identified this problem and have cautioned that the apparent similarity between information markets and gambling may prevent informa26
tion markets from thriving.
This Comment shows why policymakers should view this legal uncertainty with seriousness. As experiments suggest, the advantages of
information markets are not limited to tax revenue and amusement—
the perks that recommend activities that traditionally would be called
gambling. Information markets promise second-order benefits—
possibly even new product markets for predictions, as in the case of
HSX. An ambiguous legal status discourages experimentation in two
dimensions: first, prospective operators of information markets may
be deterred by the threat of prosecution under state or federal gam27
bling statutes; and second, payment-system providers could refuse to
28
provide liquidity to traders in nascent markets.
In the years since the Internet has emerged as an economic force,
29
30
law enforcement authorities and academics have begun to confront

25

Id. at 180; see also Tom W. Bell, Prediction Markets for Promoting the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 37, 65 (2006) (“A real-money prediction
market in claims about science and technology should run little risk of violating the
various prohibitions that U.S. law imposes on unlicensed gaming transactions. Uncertainty persists, however, due to the vagaries of anti-gambling laws and the still-untested
question of their application to prediction markets.”). Another recent article proposes
that the Commodities Futures Trading Commission should regulate information markets. See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, A New Approach for Regulating Information
Markets, 29 J. REG. ECON. 265, 268 (2006).
26
See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Introduction to Information Markets, in INFORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3, at 1, 6 (identifying the concern that states may
treat information markets as “a kind of Internet gambling”); Posting of Saul Levmore
to University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, Gambling Laws, http://
uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/08/gambling_laws.html (Aug. 11, 2006, 12:06
PM) (same).
27
Bell, supra note 23, at 165-68; see, e.g., BetonSports, 3 Other Companies Are Indicted
in U.S., WALL ST. J., Jul. 18, 2006, at D2 (reporting the indictment of a prominent
online sports gambling company for racketeering, conspiracy, and fraud).
28
See Michael Anastasio, The Enforceability of Internet Gambling Debts: Laws, Policies,
and Causes of Action, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, ¶¶ 8-12 (2001), http://www.vjolt.net/
vol6/issue1/v6i1a06-Anastasio.html (explaining that, because contracts for gambling
debt are illegal in most states, there is an active dispute over the ability of credit card
providers to accept charges from Internet gambling activities and to collect debts incurred from such gambling transactions); see also infra note 31 and accompanying text
(discussing the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006).
29
See generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNET GAMBLING: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE ISSUES (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0389.pdf (presenting Congress with research on some of the challenges of regulating online gambling).
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the new problems of online gambling. The information market straddles a blurry line between legitimate commerce and illegal gambling.
As online entertainment renews regulatory concerns about gambling,
it is important to determine the place of information markets in U.S.
31
gambling law. The specter of enforcement in an era of increased
visibility of “problem gambling” may deter social experiments and
chill the development of valuable new products.
This Comment presses two claims. The first, a descriptive claim
about gambling law doctrine, is that some information markets are
not clearly illegal games of chance, but the question is close enough
to warrant concern. The second, a normative claim, is that information markets are distinguishable from most traditional gambling
forms, and for that reason governments should consider allowing information market experiments to thrive without the threat of prosecution. To that end, I propose a carve-out in state gambling laws for
specified information market experiments. History reveals a variety of
exceptions to serve other ends, and I argue that information markets
deserve similar treatment.

30

See generally JOHN LYMAN MASON & MICHAEL NELSON, GOVERNING GAMBLING 8185 (2001) (discussing the proliferation of Internet gambling and congressional efforts
to regulate it); I. NELSON ROSE & MARTIN D. OWENS JR., INTERNET GAMING LAW (2005)
(examining the legality of online gambling). One analysis that long preceded the public embrace of the Internet unwittingly provided a point of contrast for Internet regulation. During the heyday of government regulation in the mid-twentieth century,
games
required a fixed location and schedule. The bettor had to be able to come to
a particular place at a particular time to place his or her bet. This made the
gambling organization vulnerable to police intervention at precisely that
point. The numbers collector could be easily identified by the flow of traffic
at mid-morning.
Peter Reuter, Police Regulation of Illegal Gambling: Frustrations of Symbolic Enforcement, 474
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 36, 38 (1984).
31
The most efficient information markets may require technology such as the
Internet. See Michael Abramowicz, Cyberadjudication, 86 IOWA L. REV. 533, 571-74
(2001) (presenting the “technological, geographic, and theoretic” arguments for the
increased efficiency of Internet markets). Whether U.S. law reaches Internet gambling transactions, particularly those that involve a foreign jurisdiction, is the subject of
ongoing debate. Bruce P. Keller, The Game’s the Same: Why Gambling in Cyberspace Violates Federal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1569, 1570-73 (1999). In October 2006, Congress enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, which seeks to discourage illegal online gambling by requiring financial institutions to ensure they do
not provide payment systems for such activities. Pub. L. No. 109-347, tit. 8, 120 Stat.
1884. This Comment assumes that information markets are within the reach of federal
and state law, and thus does not address the question of whether information markets
on the Internet might receive different legal treatment than non-Internet markets.
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Part I provides a brief history of chance games and the vexing
problems of prohibiting and regulating them. It reviews policy rationales for government involvement in gaming and outlines the associated problems of clarity, consistency, and enforcement. Part II considers whether or not information markets are clearly illegal under
current state and federal gambling laws. Part III presents a rationale
for encouraging experimentation in information markets and proposes an exception in the gambling laws to accommodate such experimentation.
I. GAMES OF CHANCE
Deciding whether information markets are properly classified as
games of chance, and determining whether the law should treat them
that way, requires a brief excursion into the nature of chance games
and the history of the uneasy relationship between gambling and the
state.
A. Historical Overview
Playing the odds is among the oldest human rituals. Archaeologi32
33
34
cal discoveries, literary works, and early laws reveal chance games-

32

See REUVEN BRENNER WITH GABRIELLE A. BRENNER, GAMBLING AND SPECULAA THEORY, A HISTORY, AND A FUTURE OF SOME HUMAN DECISIONS 8 (1990) (describing the popularity of lotteries and games of chance in ancient Greece and Rome);
Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of StateSponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 15 (1992) (“Various games of chance existed
among ancient Egyptians, Chinese, Japanese, Hebrews, Greeks, Romans and the early
Germanic Tribes.”).
33
See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and the
Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 297 n.36 (1995) (quoting several of William Shakespeare’s early
seventeenth century plays that refer to a “lottery”). A method of selection that suggests
a modern dice game or drawing of straws appears in ancient scripture. See, e.g., Leviticus 16:8 (“And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats; one lot for the LORD, and the
other lot for [the scapegoat].”); Jonah 1:7 (“And they said every one to his fellow,
‘Come, and let us cast lots, that we may know for whose cause this evil is upon us.’ So
they cast lots and the lot fell upon Jonah.”); see also BRENNER WITH BRENNER, supra
note 32, at 2-7 (describing the use of “lots” in ritual as well as in social and political decisions). Brenner cautions that, unlike some modern chance games, the ancient practices “were related to making decisions, to making up one’s mind in legal and religious
matters, and had nothing to do with games of chance” because people believed the
result was determined by divine power. Id. at 5.
34
The best-known attempt in England to curb gambling is the Statute of Anne,
enacted in 1710. See Gaming Act, 1710, 9 Ann., c. 14 (Eng.) (voiding some gambling
debts and allowing losers to sue winners to recover lost money); see also I. NELSON
TION:
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–sometimes with prizes—that span swaths of space and time. Since
35
gambling (defined broadly as “making a bet” ) is widely regarded to36
day as a vice, one might guess that it was stigmatized throughout
modern history. It was not. Chance games—legal and otherwise—
were commonplace in American colonial culture, and they sometimes
37
served important social and economic ends. People embraced lotteries because of their large revenue potential and their usefulness in
38
bolstering civic and cultural institutions. Importantly, government
leaders realized that “raffles offered a more painless method of raising
39
cash than did the imposition of a new tax.”

ROSE, GAMBLING AND THE LAW 73 (1986) (describing the Statute of Anne and its purposes and effects in regard to gambling).
35
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 679 (6th ed. 1990).
36
See Keller, supra note 31, at 1569 (“For more than a century, Americans have
believed that the social ills fostered by gambling outweigh its recreational value.”). In
the 1970s, sociologist David Oldman immersed himself in the gambler’s world by working part-time as a casino dealer. Oldman found “a polarization of attitude between
those who gamble regularly and those who do not. The former are either incomprehensible to the latter, or else typified in terms of defect or deviance.” David Oldman,
Chance and Skill: A Study of Roulette, 8 SOC. 407, 407 (1974). London’s Royal Commission on Betting, Lotteries and Gaming was counseled by its Church Committee that
gambling “divorces wealth from worth and is of such a nature that if it becomes a governing principle of business and finance it would mean utter chaos.” Id. at 408.
37
See generally JOHN SAMUEL EZELL, FORTUNE’S MERRY WHEEL: THE LOTTERY IN
AMERICA 29-59 (1960) (discussing the historical background of the lottery in colonial
America); Rychlak, supra note 33, at 299-300 (describing the use of lotteries to raise
money for the Jamestown settlement in Virginia, to improve infrastructure in colonial
America, and to found several now-prominent colleges and universities). Lotteries
were particularly important to early social and economic development in Pennsylvania.
See EDMUND S. MORGAN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 67-68 (2002) (describing a wildly popular
lottery plan awarding “prizes,” through which Benjamin Franklin raised funds to buy
armaments and build facilities for the Pennsylvania militia). Importantly, the lottery in
early America was, for private and public fundraisers, “a substitute for what are now
customary sources of public and private finance,” such as banks and securities markets.
BRENNER WITH BRENNER, supra note 32, at 13.
38
See John Ezell, The Lottery in Colonial America, 5 WM. & MARY Q. 185, 194-95
(1948) (discussing the factors motivating colonial governments to adopt lotteries).
With the exception of the Quakers, who were morally opposed to gambling, id. at 188,
early Americans generally
felt that as long as there was protection against fraud, it was their own affair if
they risked their money. This feeling was particularly strong when the undertaking was linked with an enterprise for public good. Loyal citizens were even
willing to circumvent the law by holding a drawing outside the colony if need
be, when a church or school was to benefit.
Id. at 194.
39
Id. See also ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES 132 (2001) (“By 1831 eight states spon-
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Legal gambling in America waned in the early twentieth century.
But states again embraced lotteries beginning in the 1960s because of
the potential for state-run games to raise revenue and ease the tax
41
burden on residents. Over time, moral objections to gambling increasingly yielded to apparent economic interests. Lawrence Friedman argues that the historical growth in popularity of “vices” such as
gambling is emblematic of the early twentieth century cultural change
42
that followed the repeal of Prohibition.
He further argues that
states, seeing the revenue potential, rushed to exploit the movement
43
in mores.
At the end of the twentieth century, gambling was widespread;
about seventy percent of Americans in 1998 admitted to gambling
44
during the previous year. By 2001, thirty-eight states and the District
45
of Columbia had government-run lotteries, and those programs ap46
peared to have broad public support. Sports betting, a very different

sored 420 lotteries yielding $66 million, over five times the budget of the federal government.”).
40
See Rychlak, supra note 33, at 303 (discussing the relative lack of legalized and
state-sponsored gambling from the turn of the century until the mid-1960s). For a discussion of the development of gambling regulation over time, see infra Part I.C.
41
See Rychlak, supra note 33, at 303 (discussing several examples of the reintroduction of the state-run lottery); see also NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, REPORT 2-1 (1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] (finding that “in 1997 lotteries existed in 37 states and the
District of Columbia and garnered $34 billion in sales”). Historians posit that governments sometimes respond to underground numbers games by establishing legal lotteries in order to capture tax revenue. See, e.g., BRENNER WITH BRENNER, supra note 32, at
9-10 (recounting the reinstatement of the state-sponsored lottery in post-Revolution
France when the government realized it was forgoing a revenue source).
42
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 228-29 (2002).
43
See id. (“Lottery laws turned state governments into high-class bookies.”).
44
MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 129 (“About 68 percent of the adult
population in 1998 reported having participated in some form of recreational gambling in the past year; in that same year, about 64 percent consumed alcohol.” (citations omitted)).
45
See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 10 (listing state lotteries and their dates
of establishment).
46
See id. at 13 (“Public support for lotteries in national Gallup polls rose from 61
percent in 1975 to 72 percent in 1982, and has remained above 70 percent ever
since.”). However, a recent survey suggests public support may be slipping as financial
stakes increase. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., GAMBLING: AS THE TAKE RISES, SO DOES PUBLIC CONCERN 2 (2006), http://pewresearch.org/assets/social/pdf/Gambling.pdf
(“The negative turn in attitudes toward gambling appears to be driven by concerns
that people are gambling too much rather than by any revival of the once common
view that gambling is immoral.”).
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47

kind of game, is also wildly popular. Although legal sports bets can
be placed through casinos in Nevada, it is estimated that up to ninety48
nine percent of all sports betting in America is illegal. It seems to be
49
particularly attractive to young people.
B. The Government’s Interest
If a chance game is such an economically potent (and, presumably, personally exhilarating) transaction, then why heavily regulate or
prohibit it? Over time, a number of different rationales have been
posed, and the type and extent of regulations have varied.
It is hard to see, at first glance, how a roulette wheel could create
wealth. Thus, a fundamental criticism of gambling is that it “involves
simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals, creat50
ing no new money or goods.” This is too simple a critique, as it ig51
nores the subjective entertainment value to gamblers. Even if gam47

See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 87-88 (arguing that the popularity of
sports betting is driven both by Americans’ desire to gamble generally and by widespread access to information that is useful in sports betting).
48
Id. at 85-86. The authors note that the total annual amount of sports bets in the
United States is likely between $85 billion and $400 billion, hardly any of which is reported to the Internal Revenue Service. Id. The reluctance to legalize sports betting is
grounded not in “puritanical attitudes,” but in “concerns about the threat it would
pose to the integrity of games that are close to holy rites in contemporary American
life.” MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 139-40. But legalization of other gambling forms may have brightened the prospects for illegal sports bookmakers. See id. at
143 (“Gambling is legitimized and the stigma of betting with bookmakers rather than
legal operations seems to be declining.”); id. at 136 (“The major forms of gambling are
now readily available in legal forms, with the important exception of wagering on
sports events. . . . Off-track betting is now spreading throughout the country, allowing
bettors to wager on horse races nationally, exactly the service offered by the classic
bookmaker depicted in the film The Sting.”). In perhaps the most infamous corruption scandal in professional sports history, eight Chicago White Sox players conspired
with gamblers to fix the 1919 World Series. The “Black Sox” lost to the Cincinnati
Reds in eight games. See generally ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND
THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (Henry Holt & Co. 1987) (1963).
49
See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 88 (citing a 1999 Gallup poll in which
“27 percent of teenagers reported that they had bet on a professional sporting event in
the past year,” compared with only thirteen percent of the surveyed adults).
50
PAUL ANTHONY SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425 (1971).
51
See Guy Calvert, Gambling America: Balancing the Risks of Gambling and Its Regulation, POLICY ANALYSIS (CATO Inst., Washington, D.C.), June 18, 1999, at 7, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa349.pdf (discussing an additional, and often ignored, utility value of gambling: “the inherent enjoyment of the game”); see also Oldman, supra note 36, at 424 (arguing that “the overall monetary loss that one makes
when playing roulette” is properly seen as a payment for roulette’s entertainment value
to the player—an “entrance fee”).
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bling is not a zero-sum pursuit, however, it may carry negative externalities into the broader social realm. Gambling “disorders,” for ex52
ample, are now commonly acknowledged in psychology and in
popular culture. In the mid-1990s, Congress created the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission to “conduct a comprehensive
study of the social and economic impacts of gambling in the United
53
54
States.” The Commission released its lengthy report in 1999, concluding that pathological gambling causes a “variety of financial,
physical, and emotional problems, including divorce, domestic violence, child abuse and neglect, and a range of problems stemming
55
from . . . severe financial hardship.” In a recent example of the effects of compulsive gambling, a college student was charged with robbing a Pennsylvania bank, allegedly in order to feed his gambling ad56
diction.
Judges have even allowed evidence of such disorders in
criminal cases to support diminished capacity arguments for sentence
57
reductions.
The problem has become so widespread that some
states now offer compulsive gamblers a state-sponsored self-help op58
tion. For example, Missouri has established a voluntary program by
which a gambler may contract with a casino operator to permanently
59
bar her from the casino’s premises. The law enlists the casinos to
60
ensure that the gambler cannot bend on her promise not to gamble.
Internet gambling is likely to present a particularly potent threat
to younger people, who find the technology exciting and easily acces-

52

See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41, at 4-2 (listing the characteristics of
“pathological gambling” as defined under the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual).
53
National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 104-169, § 2, 110
Stat. 1482 (1996).
54
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 41.
55
Id. at 4-13. Other pronounced consequences for pathological gamblers included unemployment and bankruptcy. Id.
56
Rachel Dissell, Student from Ohio Robbed Bank To Feed Gambling Habit, Lawyer Says,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 14, 2005, at A11.
57
See generally Justin W. Starr, Comment, Diminished Capacity Departures for Compulsive Gambling: Punishing the Pathological or Pardoning the Common Criminal?, 2003 BYU L.
REV. 385 (discussing, and ultimately criticizing, downward departures in sentencing for
compulsive gamblers).
58
See Andy Rhea, Voluntary Self Exclusion Lists: How They Work and Potential Problems,
9 GAMING L. REV. 462, 463-64 (2005) (discussing programs through which individuals
can voluntarily bar themselves from casinos).
59
See id. (explaining Missouri’s program). Similar programs exist in New Jersey,
Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, and Michigan. Id. at 463.
60
Id. at 463-64.
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61

sible. In addition to the effects on the gamblers themselves, another
policy concern is that gambling will indirectly further other crime.
For example, a casino—online or not—is an attractive front for
62
money laundering.
C. Regulatory Approaches
Efforts in the American colonies to restrict gambling were aimed
63
at rooting out “idleness,” or the waste of time and money.
This
seems to have remained a minority view as legal lotteries flourished
64
until the early 1800s. By that time, a majority of the states had estab65
66
lished drawings. But widespread corruption in the lottery business,
67
combined with renewed moralistic critiques of gambling, prompted
a quick tightening of the noose around lotteries through the mid68
69
1800s, until almost every state had prohibited them and Congress
had banned lottery materials from the mail and interstate com-

61

MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 83. But see James F. Smith & Vicki Abt,
Gambling as Play, 474 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 122, 131-32 (1984) (explaining how games popular with children and adolescents tend to involve at least some
skill, whereas many games popular with adults are purely chance based).
62
See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 83 (explaining how money launderers
could take advantage of unregulated Internet gaming sites).
63
See Rychlak, supra note 33, at 298 (describing Puritans’ aversion to the “unproductive use of time”).
64
See Rychlak, supra note 32, at 32 (“Until the early 1800s, there was little opposition to state-conducted lotteries.”).
65
See id. at 31 (noting that due to the lack of a banking system or strong central
government, lotteries were necessary to fund public works).
66
See MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 132-33 (recounting corruption scandals of the late nineteenth century).
67
A Supreme Court opinion from this era colorfully states the public morals critique and draws an interesting distinction between lotteries and what apparently were
seen as less harmful games:
The suppression of nuisances injurious to public health or morality is among
the most important duties of government. Experience has shown that the
common forms of gambling are comparatively innocuous when placed in contrast with the wide-spread pestilence of lotteries. The former are confined to
a few persons and places, but the latter infests the whole community: it enters
every dwelling; it reaches every class; it preys upon the hard earnings of the
poor; it plunders the ignorant and simple.
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850).
68
See Rychlak, supra note 32, at 32-38 (explaining how social problems associated
with state-sponsored gambling and growing concern about fraudulent lotteries resulted in more state control of lotteries).
69
Id. at 44.
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70

merce. The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed, and famously refused to
71
disturb, Congress’s lottery prohibitions in Champion v. Ames.
The federal government’s twentieth century attempts to curb
prize gaming initially were aimed at fighting an organized crime problem that was viewed as both a cause and an effect of illegal gambling.
The Senate’s influential “Kefauver Committee,” or the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, responded to the apparent ineffectiveness of state gambling enforcement and the easy transport of gambling devices in interstate
72
commerce.
The Committee’s investigation culminated in the pas73
sage of the Johnson Act.
Its investigation also informed Attorney
74
General Robert F. Kennedy’s later campaign against organized crime
and the resulting legislative efforts, which included the Interstate Wire
75
76
Act, the Travel Act, and a law restricting the “transportation of wa70

See Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat. 963 (prohibiting the movement of lottery tickets through interstate and foreign commerce).
71
(Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903). The Court held that the constitutional
power to regulate interstate commerce included the power to prohibit items from entering such commerce in the first place:
If a State, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries within
its own limits, may properly take into view the evils that inhere in the raising
of money, in that mode, why may not Congress, invested with the power to
regulate commerce among the several States, provide that such commerce
shall not be polluted by the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another?
Id. at 356. The Court also recalled with approval its earlier admonition that “no state
may bargain away its power to protect the public morals.” Id. (citing Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488, 497 (1897)).
72
See G. Robert Blakey & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law of
Gambling, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 923, 960-62 (1978) (explaining the Kefauver Committee’s mandate and its role in policy formation).
73
15 U.S.C. §§ 1171-1178 (2000) (banning the transport of certain gaming devices
across state lines).
74
See Blakey & Kurland, supra note 72, at 964-77 (reviewing Kennedy’s fight
against organized crime and the related legislation).
75
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). The relevant section provides:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign
commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.
Id. § 1084(a).
76
Id. § 1952 (prohibiting travel across state lines with “intent” to engage in illegal
business transactions).
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77

gering paraphernalia.”
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized
78
Crime Control Act, which further restricted gambling activities. In
response to the technological boom, Congress has considered ways to
curb Internet gambling. One failed attempt was the Internet Gam79
bling Prohibition Act, introduced by Senator John Kyl of Arizona in
80
1997. Very recently, Congress enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, which seeks to prevent credit provid81
ers from participating in illegal online gambling operations.
A diffuse array of state and federal laws regulate games of chance
82
today. State laws dominate in the majority of cases, because most of
83
the relevant federal statutes define offenses by reference to state law.
Recent developments, however, suggest that an increase in the federal
84
role might be inevitable.
1. Policy and Enforcement Concerns
While concern for “public health or morality” may be a plausible
85
justification for the restriction of any activity, a careful analysis exposes a degree of inconsistency in policy and enforcement in the
77

Id. § 1953.
Id. § 1955 (prohibiting gambling businesses that meet certain requirements).
79
S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997) (proposing that the placing of bets over the Internet
be made illegal); H.R. 2380, 105th Cong. (1997) (same).
80
See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 84 (discussing the proposed Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act and observing that it passed overwhelmingly in the Senate
three times).
81
See supra note 31 (discussing the Act).
82
For a history of federal regulation of prize games, see generally Blakey & Kurland, supra note 72; James H. Frey, Federal Involvement in U.S. Gaming Regulation, 556
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 138 (1998).
83
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1955(b)(1) (2000) (defining an “illegal gambling business”
as one which violates the law of the state in which it is conducted); Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, id. § 1961(6) (2000) (incorporating state law
into the definition of an “unlawful debt” incurred in gambling activity); see also Bell,
supra note 23, at 165 n.26 (discussing the dependence of federal statutes on state law
for definitions).
84
See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 80 (arguing that the rise of the Internet
and the popularity of interstate sports betting point toward a federal solution); see also
id. at 81 (observing that the National Association of Attorneys General asked the federal government to assume a more active role in regulating Internet gambling, since
enforcement by states is difficult).
85
Phalen v. Virginia, 49 U.S. 163, 168 (1850). But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 577 (2003) (“‘[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally
viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice . . . .’” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting))).
78
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gambling area. For example, the lottery, which is the most popular
form of gambling and the one provided by the largest number of
states, is questionable as a policy matter. As a revenue-raising scheme,
86
it is regressive: its burden falls disproportionately on the poor. It
also places the state in the uncomfortable position of contradicting
itself on financial literacy and education by discouraging saving and
87
promoting reliance on luck. Some state lotteries offer “video lottery
terminals,” which are “made with the intention of looking and sound88
ing like slot machines.” Permitting these machines while prohibiting
private slot parlors, as some states do, makes it difficult to see a coher89
ent antigambling state policy.
William Stuntz argues that inconsistent enforcement in the states
has eroded the social norms that motivated the enactment of the laws
90
in the first place. A comparatively blunt, but sensible, critique simply observes that most states are now themselves in the gambling busi91
92
93
ness.
Only two states—Utah and Hawaii —now prohibit prize

86

MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 25; see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note
39, at 141-42 (describing the “regressive” nature of the lottery). The authors concede
that illegal numbers games, which state lotteries partially displaced, may have been
even more regressive than legal state lotteries, and in the illegal games the revenues
went to corrupt organizations rather than state coffers. Id. at 142.
87
MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 25; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., A Channeling
Approach to Gambling (and Derivatives) Regulation 6 (Aug. 11, 2003) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (“It is remarkably unseemly, to say the least, that the
same states that have enacted or implemented welfare laws which limit benefits to
those who are willing to work also promote their lotteries as a way for winners to become so wealthy that they ‘will never have to do another day of work.’”).
88
MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 23, 28.
89
See id. at 28 (“[B]ecause these [video lottery terminal] machines are made with
the intention of looking and sounding like slot machines, states that have legalized
VLTs but have not legalized casinos are entering a gray area between what their policies allow and what their lottery agencies practice.”); see also ROSE & OWENS, supra note
30, at 6 (describing a Nevada law “making it a crime . . . for anyone anywhere in the
world to take a bet on-line from anyone physically in Nevada” and vice-versa, but exempting state-licensed operators in Nevada); Calvert, supra note 51, at 11 (arguing that
by prohibiting private lotteries, states are able to extract unjustifiable monopoly rents).
90
See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1878 & n.18
(2000) (observing that those who play “upscale games” escape prosecution while states
shut down “numbers rackets,” the latter of which cater almost exclusively to the urban
poor). Stuntz theorizes that the “differential enforcement” of vice laws produces revolutions in social norms that eventually swallow the laws. Id. at 1878-80; see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 129 (“[G]ambling in the context of commerce is
frequently seen as constructive and wealth enhancing while recreational wagering, as
for example in the state lottery, is merely redistributive.”).
91
FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 229; see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at
138 (“[States] are directly stimulating demand to generate revenues from the high tax
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94

gaming without exception.
Many states allow casinos of various
95
kinds and the dollars involved are substantial: in financial terms,
“legalized gambling is bigger than movies, bigger than spectator
sports, bigger than theme parks, bigger than all the books, magazines,
96
and newspapers published in the United States put together.”
Enforcing gambling laws is fraught with difficulty. Unlike in many
other areas of the law, prohibition and regulation of gambling transactions amount to curbing a market in which people conduct what
they may believe to be mutually beneficial transactions. There are
practical problems to policing such “illegal” markets. First, large
numbers of people who usually comply with police requests disagree
with the intervention in the market, making them less likely to comply
in this context. Second, participation in illegal markets only occa97
sionally produces a victim who will inform police. During the organized crime era, corruption posed another problem for enforcement.
Due to the visibility of some gambling operations, proprietors “were
strongly motivated to make payments to ensure that the police did not
98
interrupt” the business. Another possible explanation for the failure
of the 1960s assault on gambling is that many people simply ceased to
feel strongly about its illegality and, therefore, it became difficult for
99
officials to show concrete positive results.

rate on lottery play. However, the justification for that high tax is the belief that gambling is an activity of questionable worth; these are hard to reconcile when the state
creates new players.” (citation omitted)).
92
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1102 (2003).
93
HAW. REV. STAT. § 712-1223 (1993).
94
John M. Norwood, Gambling in the Twenty-First Century: Judicial Resolution of Current Issues, 74 MISS. L.J. 779, 779 n.2 (2005).
95
See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 2 (“Eleven states, most of them in the
nation’s heartland, now allow commercial casinos to operate. Twenty-four states have
casinos owned by American Indian tribes.”).
96
Id.
97
Reuter, supra note 30, at 37. Reuter observes that “[g]ambling was the most important illegal market for the police during the period from the repeal of Prohibition
in 1933 to about 1970,” when the enforcement of drug laws overtook gambling as the
principal police concern. Id. at 37 & n.1.
98
Id. at 38.
99
Id.; see also MACCOUN & REUTER, supra note 39, at 136 (“[G]ambling enforcement in the late twentieth century became a largely symbolic activity. It generated
headlines, mostly about corruption, but there was discernibly little faith that it accomplished much by way of crime control. Moreover, the underlying assumption, that the
activity itself needed to be criminalized, simply dissipated as a wealthier society sought
more modes of exercising its freedom.”).
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However, governments have not completely given up on enforcing
the laws on the books. In 1998, federal prosecutors shut down an off100
shore betting company operated by a U.S. citizen. In Texas in 2001,
agents conducted a successful sting operation in a club that was offer101
ing chances to win retail gift certificates worth five dollars each.
Further, federal prosecutors recently brought charges against the ex102
ecutive of a high-profile Internet gambling business.
Given the enforcement mechanisms in place, determining the status of information markets under the current regulatory scheme is essential to these
markets’ ongoing development.
II. ARE INFORMATION MARKETS GAMES OF CHANCE?
This Part addresses whether information markets fall within the
state and federal prohibitions on gambling. The following discussion
applies to the most common state law definition and federal liability
103
under the Interstate Wire Act.
A. State Law Liability
The analysis begins with the three common law elements that constitute a gambling violation in most states: consideration, the possibil104
ity of a prize, and a dominant element of chance.
1. Consideration
105

To give consideration in a game is to “risk something of value.”
There must be some chance of gain or loss to both parties to the wa-

100

See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir. 2001) (charging “conspiracy and substantive offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084” as to an Internet and
telephone sports book run out of Antigua by a U.S. citizen).
101
Twenty-Nine Gambling Devices v. State, 110 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tex. App. 2003).
The Court of Appeals of Texas held that the gift certificates constituted “gambling
proceeds” under Texas law, despite that law’s exemption for certain low-value “noncash merchandise.” Id. at 151-52; see also Norwood, supra note 94, at 780 & n.10 (discussing Twenty-Nine Gambling Devices and legal exemptions for noncash prizes of relatively little value).
102
See supra note 27 (citing the indictment of the chief executive of BetonSports).
103
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the Wire Act).
104
ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 11.
105
Id. at 12; see also 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling §§ 2-3 (1999) (discussing the necessity
that a party can lose as well as win in order for activity to constitute gambling).
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106

ger.
Most U.S. jurisdictions require that money be given as consid107
eration. Chance games in which players need not pay, but can win a
108
prize, are legal sweepstakes because they lack consideration.
For
games conducted online, the burden of Internet access itself probably
109
will not suffice as consideration.
Most information markets require players to contribute something
of value—indeed, advocates would say this is the reason for the markets’ predictive accuracy. Thus, the element of consideration would
110
be satisfied in most states in a typical information market.
2. Prize
The second necessary element is that a prize be at stake. A “free
round” is not a prize in and of itself; in other words, the reward of
111
more amusement does not suffice.
When information markets
trade with real cash, the prize element is certainly satisfied.
Notably, the Hollywood Stock Exchange operates with “play
112
money.”
One author argues that “no market limited to mere playmoney can fully duplicate the incentives generated by a market using
113
real money.”
How, then, does HSX achieve predictive success?
There is some new evidence that real money is not necessarily an essential feature of an accurate information market. Saul Levmore observes that, in the well-functioning HSX market, “players desire to win,
114
presumably because winning can be as good a motivation as profit.”
106

See 7 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON§ 17:6 (4th ed. 1997) (distinguishing wagers from competitions that simply offer prizes).
107
ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 13. A small number define consideration
more broadly as a “right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.”
Id. (quoting Op. Att’y Gen. N.Y. No. 96-F1 (Jan. 29, 1996), available at http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/lawyers/opinions/1996/formal/96_f1.html).
108
Id. at 17.
109
Id. at 18.
110
Bell, supra note 23, at 166.
111
See ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 26 (“The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions differentiate between a free replay and a credit which can be redeemed for
cash or merchandise. . . . There are no cases on record of an Internet operator being
accused of violating an anti-gambling law, when players can only win more game time
or another round of the game.”).
112
See Hollywood Stock Exchange, About HSX, http://www.hsx.com/about (last
visited Jan. 21, 2007) (describing “virtual entertainment securities”).
113
Bell, supra note 23, at 164.
114
Levmore, supra note 3, at 594.
TRACTS
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In fact, some HSX traders have been able to sell their play money on
115
auction sites such as eBay for “hundreds of real dollars.”
A 2004
study provided strong evidence on the effectiveness of play money
markets. Researchers tracked sports predictions on two information
markets that are similar in most respects, except that one uses real
116
money and the other uses play money.
They found that the predictions in the play money market were not significantly less accurate
117
than those in the real money market.
The authors noted, however,
that the predicted event—football game outcomes—is one that has a
wide and relatively informed group of prospective traders in the U.S.
118
market.
When other, lesser-known or less understood events are to
be predicted, real money may be the only way to motivate people to
119
participate and become informed.
Unfortunately, this suggests that
the most useful information markets may also be the illegal ones.
3. Chance
Generally, chance must “predominate” over skill in order for a
120
121
122
game to be illegal as a form of gambling. Bowling, chess, check123
124
125
ers, and baseball are all examples of skill games.
On the other

115

Id. at 596. Nonmonetary incentives are increasingly common online. A number of
Internet communities award nonmonetary “points” to users based on the quality of their
contributions. Users with a high number of points gain seniority and moderation privileges. See, e.g., Slashdot, FAQ—Comments and Moderation, http://www.slashdot.org/
faq/com-mod.shtml (last visited Jan. 21, 2007) (discussing “Karma,” a peer rating of
user comments on a popular online technology forum).
116
Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 10, at 245.
117
Id. at 250.
118
Id.
119
Cf. id. (suggesting that “knowledgeable traders can be motivated . . . by community bragging rights or by prizes awarded to the best forecasters”).
120
See Anthony N. Cabot & Louis V. Csoka, The Games People Play: Is It Time for a
New Legal Approach to Prize Games?, 4 NEV. L.J. 197, 223 (2003) (explaining the Predominance Test, the prevailing test for identifying a game of chance).
121
See State v. Wiley, 3 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Iowa 1942) (“Obviously, pin ball machines may not properly be compared to games of skill such as bowling or base ball
[sic].”).
122
See People ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 71 N.E. 753, 755 (N.Y. 1904) (“Throwing dice
is purely a game of chance, and chess is purely a game of skill.”).
123
See Johnson v. McDonald, 287 P. 220, 221 (Or. 1930) (“The predominant element in [checkers] is one of skill. The game would not appeal to any one who did not
like to play checkers. There is no apparent likelihood at all that the game, if played as
designed, would cultivate a spirit of gambling.”).
124
See Wiley, 3 N.W.2d at 625.
125
See generally 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 55 (1999) (discussing games of skill).

768

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 749

126

hand, poker games and contests whose outcomes depend on the
127
128
weather have been called games of chance.
Commentators have noticed that the doctrinal dichotomy of
chance and skill is a problematic one, even when applied to relatively
129
simple games. “[W]hat is, and what is not, a game of chance is not a
130
simple matter of definition by fiat.”
In playing a pure game of
chance, a person is “entirely passive; he does not deploy his resources,
skill, muscles or intelligence. All he need do is await, in hope and
131
trembling, the cast of the die.”
When games begin to blur perceptions of chance and skill, consistent classification can become problematic. John Norwood recounts
two recent cases in New York City involving the legal status of “shell
132
games.”
In a shell game, the player tries to keep track of an object
placed under one of three shells as another person rapidly moves the
133
shells.
The cases Norwood cites focus on the closely analogous
game of “three card monte,” in which the player must choose the
134
“winning” card among three cards rapidly shifted by the dealer.
In
one case, the criminal court found that three card monte is a game of

126

See State v. Schlein, 854 P.2d 296, 305 (Kan. 1993) (holding that a poker tournament turns its location into a gambling place). But see Smith & Abt, supra note 61, at
129 (“Though the deal and draw are governed by chance, unless of course someone is
cheating, the play of [poker] is ruled by skill and is a clear example of competitive
play.”).
127
See Classic Oldsmobile-Cadillac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. State, 704 A.2d 333, 335
(Me. 1997) (holding that a game that depended on the weather was illegal gambling
because there was an element of chance).
128
38 AM. JUR. 2D Gambling § 4 (1999).
It is the character of the game, and not the skill or want of skill of the player,
which determines whether a game is one of chance or skill. Thus, whether a
game is one in which skill greatly predominates over chance is not to be
measured by the standards of experts or any limited class of players, but by
that of the average skill of a majority of players likely to play the game.
Id. (citations omitted).
129
See ROSE & OWENS, supra note 30, at 18-26 (describing the element of chance
and how it factors into identifying illegal gambling activities); Cabot & Csoka, supra
note 120, at 223-24 (noting that Internet skill games raise issues as they approach
chance gambling).
130
Oldman, supra note 36, at 407. Oldman points out that even in pure chance
games, one or more players may think they can recognize patterns or probabilities.
These players may regard the game as one of skill even if it really is not. Id. at 425.
131
Id. at 408 (quoting ROGER CAILLOIS, MAN, PLAY, AND GAMES 17 (Meyer Barash
trans., 1961)).
132
Norwood, supra note 94, at 786-88.
133
Id. at 786.
134
Id.
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skill, since “the accuracy of the eye of the player competes with the
135
speed of the hand of the dealer.” Just a year later, another judge on
the same court relied on another line of cases to find that three card
monte is “essentially a game of chance, wherein the player has a onein-three chance of selecting the ‘right’ card if he can resist the opera136
tor’s manipulations and simply choose randomly.”
The problem of defining skill and chance becomes clear when
one looks to things that usually are not considered games. For example, the fact that gambling unites money and risk is not enough to distinguish it from transactions that are unquestionably legal and socially
137
valuable. The conceptual link between gambling and speculation in
138
financial instruments like derivatives, for example, is often noted.

135

People v. Mohammed, 724 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806 (Crim. Ct. 2001); see also Norwood, supra note 94, at 787 (discussing judicial determinations of “skill” and
“chance”).
136
People v. Denson, 745 N.Y.S.2d 852, 856 (Crim. Ct. 2002).
137
See Milton Friedman & L.J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,
56 J. POL. ECON. 279, 279 (1948) (analogizing an individual’s choice among occupations, securities, or lines of business activity to the decision whether to gamble).
138
See Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 375, 377 (2005) (“One thing that investing, hedging, insurance, and gambling
have in common is that they all involve risk-taking, while only the first three activities
are generally seen as involving risk-shifting or other legitimate economic benefits.”);
Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading,
Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 373-74 (2006)
(“Regulators characterize investing as an enterprise of skill in which the assiduous and
diligent may earn deserved rewards. Conversely, gambling is viewed as an enterprise of
chance that encourages the lazy and untalented to divert useful capital into a chaotic
system whereby an undeserving few reap ill-gotten gains while the vast majority foolishly lose.” (footnote omitted)); David A. Skeel, Jr., When Markets and Gambling Converge, in THEOLOGY AND THE LIBERAL STATE (forthcoming 2007) (on file with author)
(describing speculation as gambling’s “first cousin”); Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates
Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J.
701, 715 (1999) (“Common law courts regarded speculation as a type of wagering
rather than a useful form of economic commerce.”); Skeel, supra note 87, at 22 n.40
(noting that certain instruments like futures and derivatives “are designed to minimize
risk, rather than to increase it” as gambling does). Hanson argues that
[t]he history of financial regulation can . . . be roughly summarized as everything being banned as gambling (or usury) until an exception was granted for
some newly legitimized higher purpose. For each purpose, such as capitalizing firms, insuring idiosyncratic risk, or insuring common risk, laws and regulations were created to ensure that generic gambling could not slip in. We
may thus reasonably hope to someday legitimate, and thereby legalize, markets whose main function is to aggregate information on questions that matter.
Hanson, supra note 3, at 9 (citation omitted).
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Because of the diversity of events that can be predicted with information markets, the third prong of the test—the predominant ele139
ment of chance—is the most difficult to apply.
It is possible that an
information market can be legal if it is “set up so that a strong argu140
ment can be made it is genuinely skill-based.”
As Bell observes,
whether a plausible argument can be made that the market does not
run predominantly on chance depends on the nature of the uncertain
141
event.
Bell is concerned primarily with science claims, and to the
extent that a good deal of scientific knowledge is required even to
participate meaningfully in the market, it seems there is a good argu142
ment that chance does not predominate.
Perhaps some types of uncertain events in information markets
are more conducive to skill-based “bets” than others. Christine Hurt
recently offered a taxonomy of speculative transactions, using the
amount of chance involved to differentiate among seemingly similar
143
pursuits.
“L” games, such as slot machines, lotteries, and roulette,
are “pure” chance games. The player cannot control the outcome
144
through the exercise of skill. On the other hand, in “W” games, like
blackjack and poker, skilled players actually can influence outcomes,
145
but chance remains a significant factor.
Hurt analogizes these
146
games to derivatives and “day trading.”
In a separate category
(called “Type B speculation”) are sports betting and trading in individual stocks. Hurt contends these activities are dominated by skill
because of the information people typically deploy when trading or
147
betting.
Under the doctrinal analysis described above, “W” games
may have a predominant element of chance, while “Type B speculation” probably does not. If information markets can fairly be characterized as “Type B speculation,” they might escape classification as
games of chance.

139

See Bell, supra note 23, at 167 (discussing the difficulty of applying this test).
Cabot & Csoka, supra note 120, at 226.
141
Bell, supra note 23, at 167.
142
Id; see also Bell, supra note 25, at 66 (“By design, such a market concerns only
questions susceptible to resolution by dint of skill rather than chance. A prediction
market aims, after all, to promote progress in the sciences and useful arts—not merely
to reward good luck.”).
143
Hurt, supra note 138, at 378. The distinguishing factor is “the extent to which
the occurrence of a random event influences the return.” Id. at 379.
144
Id. at 379-80.
145
Id. at 381-82.
146
Id. at 382-85.
147
Id. at 387-90.
140
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On this continuum of speculative transactions, information markets would seem to fall somewhere between “W” games and “Type B
speculation.” Information markets look quite different from “L”
games: in “L” games, the uncertain event itself—for example, the spin
of the roulette wheel—is not susceptible to anyone’s knowledge or
skill. The question, then, is whether information markets are more
like “W” games (poker and blackjack or day trading and derivatives)
or “Type B speculation” (sports betting or customary trading in the
stock market). As Bell notes, the point of the market is that people
148
use information to make money —if chance entirely explained outcomes, the market would be worthless and would probably not
achieve predictive success. But the universe of useful information
markets may be quite a bit larger than the one Bell contemplates, and
there is conflicting information as to what exactly drives people to
participate. For example, attracting “uninformed traders” is a crucial
factor in efficient information markets (those that generate accurate
149
predictions).
Uninformed traders are likely to be motivated by
“[r]isk-love, or the ‘thrill of a gamble,’” rather than by superior skill or
150
knowledge. This suggests that for many traders in efficient information markets, chance may predominate over skill.
B. Federal Liability Under the Wire Act
There is ongoing debate about the extent of the Interstate Wire
Act’s prohibitions on betting on non-sports events such as casino-style
games or political contests. By its text, the statute extends to “placing
151
of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest.”
It is disputed,
however, whether “contest” encompasses bets on all types of future
uncertain events, or only those relating to sports. The Fifth Circuit
settled on the latter reading in dicta when it affirmed a Louisiana district court’s holding that “the Wire Act does not prohibit non-sports
152
Internet gambling.”
Some officials at the Justice Department ap-

148

Bell, supra note 25, at 53-54.
Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Five Open Questions about Prediction Markets, in
INFORMATION MARKETS, supra note 3, at 13, 19.
150
Id.
151
18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000).
152
In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
149
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pear to believe, by contrast, that the Wire Act reaches beyond sports
153
betting.
C. Litigation Strategies
The discussion above suggests that the law of gambling may tend
to produce different fates for seemingly similar “games.” If the government appears to be making and enforcing policy in an irrational
way, one potential avenue for redress for a criminal defendant is an
equal protection challenge. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit considered and rejected just such a challenge to Pennsyl154
vania’s gaming laws in 1997 in United States v. Williams.
The defendants in Williams were convicted of running a gambling business under the Pennsylvania statute that prohibits “‘pool selling,’
155
‘bookmaking,’ and related activities.”
On appeal, the defendants
argued that because the statute under which they were convicted prohibited some kinds of gambling, while different statutes in the same
state allowed other kinds, the state had impermissibly infringed the
defendants’ economic rights by dividing state-authorized gambling
156
from gambling not authorized by the state.
In his opinion for the
unanimous panel, then-Judge Alito easily dispensed with the defendants’ equal protection challenge, since the rights the defendants
157
claimed were not entitled to strict scrutiny.
In an interesting elaboration, the opinion favorably recalled the Supreme Court’s view in an
earlier case:
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions,
requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the
reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the
problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. The legislature
may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting
158
the others.

As the Williams case illustrates, the basic rationality and consistency of a state’s gaming policy is unlikely to be subjected to a search153

Hurt, supra note 138, at 414 n.289 (comparing the views of government lawyers
on the issue).
154
124 F.3d 411, 423 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that such a law was rationally related
to a legitimate state interest).
155
Id. at 421 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5514 (West)).
156
Id. at 421-22.
157
Id. at 423.
158
Id. (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955)
(citations omitted)).
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159

ing judicial examination. Prospective information market operators
should not expect, therefore, to be able to fight a battle in the courts
on this issue.
Although it appears that arguments about lax enforcement and
policy inconsistency are very difficult to win, defendants in gambling
cases may, as a last resort, be able to avail themselves of the protection
of the rule of lenity, by which courts strictly construe criminal statutes
160
when the statutes do not clearly cover new factual situations.
The
Second Circuit addressed such a claim in United States v. Cohen in
161
2001.
Cohen had been convicted of running a novel sports-betting
operation from Antigua, taking bets from U.S. citizens in violation of
162
the Wire Act. On appeal, Cohen argued, in part, that he lacked the
requisite mens rea because he did not knowingly violate the statute
and, further, that the rule of lenity should bar his conviction because
163
the Wire Act is too ambiguous to apply to his alleged offenses.
Cohen lost on both counts. As to the first argument, the court held
that liability under the Wire Act requires only intent to do the acts that
164
form the elements of the offense, not intent to violate the statute.
The court also applied a stringent lenity standard: Cohen failed to
165
show a “grievous ambiguity” in the statute such that the court could
166
“make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”
This
certainly is a difficult standard for defendants to meet. The Supreme
Court in recent years has been willing to recognize lenity challenges,
159

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confronted a similar question in Commonwealth v. Kratsas, 764 A.2d 20 (Pa. 2001). The defendants were charged with dealing in
gambling machines. Id. at 22. They argued in a pretrial due process challenge that
the relevant prohibitions on gambling in the state statute should be ignored, because
the conduct that formed the basis of the alleged violation had become de facto legal
because of lax enforcement. Id. at 26. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case.
Id. at 25. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, and it stressed that it lacked authority to “nullify a legislative enactment on the basis that its objectives have been frustrated, or even thwarted pervasively, even by those who are charged with enforcement
responsibility.” Id. at 26. The idea for which the court had such distaste is desuetude,
“the obscure doctrine by which a legislative enactment is judicially abrogated following
a long period of nonenforcement.” Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2209, 2209
(2006).
160
See Bell, supra note 23, at 168 n.40 (discussing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S.
259, 266 (1997), which explained the rule of lenity).
161
260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001).
162
Id. at 70-71.
163
Id. at 76.
164
Id.
165
Id. (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)).
166
Id. (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995)).
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but only where, under the criminal statute, “the defendant does not
even need to be aware of the factual circumstances that make her actions criminal to be convicted or if the defendant must be aware of the
167
relevant facts but need not be aware of their legal significance.”
As the above discussion suggests, there is a real danger that a particularly successful information market experiment could attract legal
action. This was most likely the worry that led the operators of the
IEM to obtain a “no-action” letter from the Commodity Futures Trad168
ing Commission (CFTC).
But it is difficult to know whether the
CFTC will be willing to grant additional similar exemptions for nas169
cent markets.
III. A LEGISLATIVE EXCEPTION
The benefits of information markets are still emerging, as the literature is relatively new, but the experiments are promising. The
prospect that successful information markets can improve important
public and private decisions recalls the early use of lotteries as gov170
ernment tools in the American colonies. Both phenomena promise
amusement and the chance at a windfall, but only as means toward a
larger socioeconomic end.
On the cost side of the scale, we can try to distinguish information
markets on the ground that they are less likely to carry some of the
negative externalities that inhere in traditional chance games. For
example, as opposed to commercial casinos, which concentrate rapid,
high-value financial transactions in confined physical spaces and may
therefore aggravate street crime, information markets require little or
171
no physical infrastructure.
Of course, this hardly distinguishes information markets from online blackjack; in both cases, compulsive
“play” remains a concern. But the relatively small amount we know

167

Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2435 (2006).
See Iowa Electronic Markets, Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/faq.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007) (addressing this issue under the heading “Is the IEM regulated?”).
169
See Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 26, at 6 (reporting that CFTC no-action letters
are “no longer being given out” for information markets such as IEM).
170
See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text (describing such lotteries).
171
See Nicole Davidson, Comment, Internet Gambling: Should Fantasy Sports Leagues
Be Prohibited?, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 201, 222 (2002) (“The private environment of the
Internet would not increase the incidence of street crime and prostitution. . . . Fantasy
sports contests tend not to involve great amounts of money and arguably would not
have any effect on crime rates.”).
168
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about traders in information markets seems to confirm the suspicion
that such markets are unlikely to attract people for whom windfall
profit is the ultimate object. For example, as of 2002, most IEM trad172
ers were putting less than fifty dollars into the market.
In fact, the
173
IEM limits investments to $500 per player.
Particularly where state
lotteries and slot parlors offer instant gratification, trading in information markets—where more than mere seconds or hours pass between
consideration and prize—may appear less attractive as pure enter174
tainment.
But it remains possible that if information markets grow
beyond the experimental early adopters, many of whom have purely
academic interests, the typical compulsive use problem could emerge.
The HSX example suggests that information market operators may be
175
able to use “virtual” carrots, but more obscure (albeit very useful)
176
markets might require real financial incentives.
An exception for information market experiments would not be a
legislative anomaly. For example, Alaska explicitly allows for wagers
on some uncertain events that do not concern the outcomes of sports
177
games.
At the same time, other states explicitly prohibit some con178
ceptually similar bets.
Since a majority of states allow certain forms

172

Levmore, supra note 3, at 592 n.13.
Id. at 593.
174
See Rhode & Strumpf, supra note 18, at 19 (observing that the legalization in
New York in 1939 of some betting on horse racing offered prospective gamblers “several contests per day to wager on that promised immediate rewards rather than a single political contest stretching over several months”).
175
See Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 10, at 250 (concluding that there was “no
significant difference in predictive accuracy” whether the market involved real or fake
money).
176
See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the need to attract uninformed traders for market efficiency).
177
By statute, Alaska may authorize a municipality or charitable organization to
allow, among other things, a game in which “a prize of money is awarded for the closest guess of the total number of salmon harvested commercially statewide . . . during a
certain period of time,” or one in which the goal is the “closest guess of the time of the
arrival of the first king salmon of the year at a designated spot.” ALASKA STAT.
§§ 05.15.100(a), .690(27), .690(43) (2004 & Supp. 2005); see also ROSE & OWENS, supra
note 30, at 44 (discussing nonsports bets such as wagers on the due dates of pregnant
celebrities).
178
For example, an Illinois statute includes within its definition of illegal gambling
“[s]ell[ing] pools upon the result of any game or contest of skill or chance, political
nomination, appointment or election.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/28-1(a)(6) (West
1993). Another subsection criminalizes the making of wagers on such events. Id. at
5/28-1(a)(2). In Pennsylvania, it is a first degree misdemeanor to receive a bet on a
“political nomination, appointment or election, or upon any contest of any nature.”
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5514(3) (2002).
173
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of gambling for charitable purposes, it is clear that states are willing to
179
carve out exceptions that suit their policy goals.
There are substantial practical problems with a legislative exception for information markets. First, because information markets are
relatively new and variable, there is no commonly accepted model.
This will make it difficult to write statutory language so that it is easy
for courts to determine what is and is not permitted. Some have proposed that states should establish “a review mechanism so that promoters can submit prize game schemes for proper characterization
180
under existing laws.”
A similar process for information markets
could help eliminate confusion over definitions.
A second problem is a trait of federalism that is perhaps unavoidable. Some efficient information markets would probably require the
participation of people in multiple states. This means that even if an
“early adopter” state takes the initiative to create an exception for information markets, the market may run afoul of prohibitions in federal law or the statutes of other states. Still, as IEM market experts
have observed, far more experimentation is necessary to determine
181
the optimal design of information markets.
Legislative approval of
such experimentation could clear a barrier and help reveal whether
real-money information markets will produce benefits that outweigh
their social costs.
CONCLUSION
Governments should encourage information market experiments
by providing legal clarity. Markets could improve public and private
decision making and spawn entirely new product markets, but the current ambiguous gambling doctrine may stifle market development. As
policymakers consider whether to raise revenue by licensing traditional gambling forms such as slot machine parlors, it would be
worthwhile to include this new decision tool in the debate.
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See MASON & NELSON, supra note 30, at 30 (stating that “[c]haritable bingo . . .
is legal in every state but Arkansas, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Utah”).
180
Cabot & Csoka, supra note 120, at 259.
181
See Berg & Rietz, supra note 16, at 164 (describing the “many open questions
about prediction markets and when they are likely to be most accurate”).

